In this briefing
- RSA Agent ID registers an Agent as an independent identity with an owner, risk tier and lifecycle state, and it brings tool calls, high-risk approval and access revocation at decommissioning into the same control scope.
- Google Cloud lets an Agent2Agent Agent complete three-legged OAuth authorisation on behalf of the signed-in user, but the wider Agent2Agent registration and management capability remains in Preview.
- Amazon Bedrock AgentCore and Google Cloud credential-management tools respectively extend authorisation-server compatibility and credential-lifecycle operations, while enterprises still need to design permission approval, logging boundaries and emergency revocation separately.
RSA Registers Agents as Independent Identities
In its announcement published on 7 October 2026, RSA lists 16 November 2026 as the general-availability date for RSA Agent ID Discover and Secure, and RSA lists the first half of 2027 as the general-availability period for Govern. Discover finds Agents and Model Context Protocol servers in an environment and records an owner, risk tier and lifecycle state for each Agent. Secure enforces policy at the tool and argument level and requires an authenticated person to approve actions that the enterprise marks as high risk.
The current RSA product page also states that an enterprise can choose cloud, hybrid or on-premises deployment for each gateway. When an enterprise hosts the gateway itself, the enterprise can keep policy decisions, keys and enforcement evidence in its environment, but RSA still plans to provide the fully air-gapped, self-managed version in 2027. This timing boundary means that the current general-availability status of the modules cannot be expanded into a claim that the complete offline form is already available for procurement.
For enterprise adoption, an enterprise needs to place the owner, risk tier, lifecycle state and decommissioning condition for each Agent in its identity directory before the enterprise grants tool permissions to the runtime. If separate systems manage identity registration and call policies, the enterprise also needs to verify that both systems update together when an identity is created, changed or decommissioned.
Google Cloud Adds User Delegation to the Agent Call Chain
In its release notes published on 13 November 2026, Google Cloud states that three-legged OAuth authentication with Agent Identity auth manager for Agent2Agent Agents in Gemini Enterprise is generally available. An Agent built with Agent Development Kit and deployed on Agent Runtime can access downstream Model Context Protocol servers, Google Cloud services and third-party application programming interfaces on behalf of the signed-in Gemini Enterprise user. When a tool needs user consent, Gemini Enterprise prompts the user, validates the callback, finalises the credential and resumes the Agent2Agent conversation.
Google Cloud still marks the wider Agent2Agent registration and management capability as Preview, and the documentation requires the customer to host and maintain its Agent2Agent Agents. The documentation also states that the Model Armor settings in the Gemini Enterprise console do not automatically protect Agent2Agent Agents, so developers must configure that protection in the Agent application code through the REST application programming interface. The general-availability status of a specific authentication integration therefore cannot replace separate verification of the wider platform status and security configuration.
For enterprise adoption, an enterprise needs to record the Agent's own identity separately from the identity of the user whom the Agent represents. A user-consent flow can prove the source of a particular delegation, but the enterprise still needs to limit the authorisation scope, credential lifetime, callback address, conversation-resumption condition and revocation method. The enterprise also needs to retain a record that connects the user, Agent, tool and final business action.
Amazon Web Services Expands Authorisation-Server Compatibility
On 13 November 2026, Amazon Web Services announced that Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Identity supports both OpenID Connect and OAuth 2.0 authorisation-server discovery URLs. The capability applies to inbound JSON Web Token authorisation. AgentCore's outbound OAuth credential-provider configuration allows an authorisation server that does not implement OpenID Connect but publishes standard OAuth 2.0 metadata to connect to AgentCore.
Amazon Web Services states that the capability is available in every region where Amazon Bedrock AgentCore is available and that the capability does not incur an additional charge. Wider authorisation-server compatibility resolves only metadata discovery and connection. An enterprise still needs to confirm through its own integration tests whether its existing identity system supports the required authorisation type, token audience, key rotation, sign-out and emergency revocation.
For enterprise adoption, an enterprise can reduce the work required to write custom discovery logic for different authorisation servers, but the enterprise cannot treat protocol compatibility as proof that permission design is complete. The enterprise still needs to check which authorisation scopes each Agent can request, who stores each token, who revokes a leaked token and whether cross-region calls comply with data and audit requirements.
Google Cloud Opens Credential Lifecycles to Agent Tools
Google Cloud documentation for the API Keys remote Model Context Protocol server states that an artificial-intelligence application can use tools to create, inspect, restrict, rotate and delete application programming interface keys in a Google Cloud project. The server uses OAuth 2.0 and Identity and Access Management for authentication and authorisation, and the server does not accept application programming interface keys as its own authentication method. Google Cloud also recommends that an enterprise create a separate identity for an Agent that uses these tools.
Google Cloud separates tool calls, key management and access to key strings into different roles and permissions. The documentation also states that Model Armor records the complete payload when logging is enabled, and that jurisdictional routing can cause some requests to skip Model Armor screening without writing a log entry or an error. An enterprise therefore cannot assume that an Agent has approval to read key strings or delete keys merely because the Agent can call credential tools.
For enterprise adoption, an enterprise needs to treat the credential lifecycle as an auditable business process instead of treating a key as a static value that remains in a configuration file. The enterprise can assign creation, restriction, rotation and deletion to different roles, and the enterprise can establish separate approvals and alerts for access to key strings, high-risk changes and skipped security screening.
What to watch next
- Will RSA publish the exact support scope, price, migration method and local-gateway operating requirements for Discover and Secure after general availability?
- Will Google Cloud move the wider Agent2Agent registration and management capability from Preview to general availability, and will Google Cloud align the Model Armor protection in console settings with the protection configured in Agent code?
- Will major Agent platforms provide an exportable audit format for delegation chains, credential rotation and emergency revocation across identity systems?
Sources and verification
Golden Data has edited this briefing from the public materials listed above. The original sources govern facts and figures. The enterprise relevance sections are Golden Data editorial analysis and do not constitute an endorsement of any third-party product.
← Back to AI Daily Briefing